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CANADIAN CULTURAL INDUSTRIES EXEMPTION FROM
NAFTA-ITS PARAMETERS
Ronald G. Atkey*
I. INTRODUCTION

Technically, this could be quite a short Article. The Canadian government has never formally invoked the cultural industries exemption
under either NAFTA (since January 1, 1994) or the Canada-United
States FTA (1989-93). Accordingly, it has not been necessary for any
third party adjudicator to look at the scope of the definition of "cultural
industries."' Neither has it been necessary for any third party adjudicator to examine the nature and extent of permitted retaliation, i.e., "measures of equivalent commercial effect," in response to actions that would
have been inconsistent with FTA or NAFTA, but for the cultural industries exemption.
The most that one can say about this permitted retaliation, on the
plain meaning of the words2 is that there must be commercial parity in
terms of the dollar value of the trade or investment affected or likely to
be affected by the inconsistency. It is my understanding that there may
be written interpretations to this effect operative in both the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAJT), but that is
the extent of it. There also appears to be some agreement on both sides
of the border that any retaliatory measures taken need not be limited to
the same trade sector or industry which was subject to the inconsistent
treatment under the free trade rules although this point has also never
been formally considered by any third party adjudicator.
In summary, if this Article were to end here, the cultural industries
Co-Chair of the Public Law and Regulatory Affairs Department at Osler, Hoskin &
Harcourt. This Article was prepared with the assistance of Jennifer Fong, a Canadian associate
assigned to the firm's New York office.
' U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan 2., 1988. 27 I.L.M. at art. 2012 (hereinafter
FIA). North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, Ch. 17, 32 I.L.M. 296 at art. 2107
(hereinafter NAFrA).
2

FTA supra note 1, at art. 2005(ii). NAFrA supra note 1, at 2106, Annex 2106).
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exemption would warrant little more than a technical footnote, or at best
be characterized as a "standstill arrangement" or political trophy extracted by the Mulroney government in the eleventh hour of the 1988 FTA
negotiations to placate cultural nationalists in central Canada immediately prior to the upcoming election, with reluctant acquiescence from
the U.S. negotiators.
The fact is, however, notwithstanding the lack of formal invocation
of the exemption, cultural industries currently occupy a significant portion of the dispute agenda between Canada and the United States for
both trade and investment. Moreover, this dispute agenda involving
cultural industries is growing year after year as both countries become
emboldened by recent successes: Canada with the more restrictive broadcasting policy developed and applied by the Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) most recently to direct-tohome pay-per-view services, and the United States with its successful
challenge before a WTO panel to Canadian discriminatory measures
applicable to split-run magazines.
The extent to which cultural industries are tending to dominate the
formal dispute agenda between Canada and the United States can be
fully appreciated by a review of portions of a key document published
by the USTR on March 31, 1997 entitled, 1997 Foreign Trade Barriers.
In the section reviewing Canada, the Report discusses some twenty
barriers to trade and investment between Canada and the United States.
Many of these Canadian barriers affect cultural industries: magazines,
sale of audio tapes, delisting of non-Canadian broadcasting services,
non-proprietary rights condition applicable to direct-to-home (DTH) payper-view, revenue splitting condition applied to DTH pay-per-view, DTH
audio services, basic telecommunications services, border broadcasting,
foreign investment in publishing, and foreign investment in film distribution. In effect, it is fully one-half of the Canada-U.S. agenda of foreign
trade barriers.
So the reality is, cultural industries exemption notwithstanding, there
are significant trade and investment issues where Canada and the United
States are at odds and which will, in all likelihood, have to be resolved
outside the dispute settlement mechanisms under NAFTA. Indeed, the
cultural industries provisions of the FTA and NAFTA, when read together, make it clear that the consultation and dispute settlement or
arbitration provisions under NAFTA, normally available when there has
been a nullification or impairment of any benefit under NAFrA, are
specifically not available when the dispute involves cultural industries
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(Article 2011(ii) of FTA, Annex 2106 under NAFTA).3
In short, the more appropriate title of today's panel might have been
"Canada-U.S. Cultural Industries Disputes Outside of NAFTA."
II. THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
Before examining the Canadian instruments for protecting culture, it
is a useful if not frustrating exercise to try to define Canadian culture.

To put it directly: how are Canadians different from Americans?
In my own simplistic way, I have often thought of Canadians as
gentler, more polite, less aggressive, insecure but more tolerant, accom-

modating bilingualism, embracing multiculturalism, finding strength in
diversity, resourceful, traditional, and committed to peace, order, and
good government. Does this have anything to do with culture? I think it
does. It is part of what flows from our Canadian way of doing things
and represents many of the shared values of Canadian individuals and

institutions.
One of our most famous authors, the late Robertson Davies, described our cultural differences in terms of psychology. In a U.S. magazine article written at the time of the introduction of the FTA in 1989,
he quoted a Canadian artist, saying, "The U.S. frontier is in the West

and the hero is an outlaw; the Canadian frontier is in the North and its
hero is a policeman." Robertson Davies then told his American readers,
"Your aspiration toward life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is one
that we admire, but our own is for public order and good government."
That is the conventional view in Canada. But it took a somewhat
irreverent book on Canadian pop culture called Mondo Canuck published
last fall and written by two young television journalists, Geoff Pevere
and Greig Dymond, to strip away all the veneer and get at the root of

what being Canadian is all about. Let me quote at length from their

' My fellow panelist John Ragosta will outline for you how the U.S. and Canadian technical interpretations of the NAFTA exemption provision differ. The Americans apparently read the
NAFTA provision as simply repeating the FTA provision: a party is permitted to take actions
inconsistent with NAFTA involving cultural industries, but the other party has an automatic right
of retaliation if its industries are harmed by this protection. Some Canadian officials argue that
NAFTA has literally, rather than functionally, transplanted the FTA system for cultural industries.
This is to suggest that only the FTA, and not NAFTA, obligations are subject to the derogationand-right-of-retaliation scheme, leading to the possible result that, say, intellectual property obligations and certain service areas (not covered by FTA) could be breached by Canada without
NAFrA-based U.S. retaliation. So far, this difference of opinion in interpretation has been proceeding more on the academic rather than practical or political level although there are no assurances that this state of affairs will continue indefinitely. FTA, supra note 1, at art. 2011(ii).
NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 2106.
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introduction:
To grow up in those parts of this country called "English Canada" is to grow up
with a peculiar certainty of the in-betweeness of things. It is to come to define
yourself more readily as what you aren't than what you are, and to learn to register constant equivocation merely by the simple rhetorical attachment of a tentative
"eh" to the end of otherwise declarative statements, as in "Hey, give back my
damned wallet, eh?" Because neither your measuring nor monetary systems correspond with the most influential cultural, political and economic presence on your
continent, as a Canadian you learn to do metric and financial conversions almost
as early as you learn to skate. Though your background may be Chinese,
Romanian, Ojibway and Haitian, you know the proper French phrase for things
like "high in dietary fibre," and "now enriched with six essential vitamins" from
staring daily at bilingual cereal boxes. You grow up strafed by the relentless barrage of American media, yet every time you reach for change you realize you
still share a queen with the tiny, distant island which was once your colonial
master. To be a Canadian is to live in the space between certainties, to dwell in
the gap that separates conviction from speculation. To be Canadian, in other
words, is to exist in a state of constant becoming.
This explains why there may be no other country which has managed to
turn the process of self-definition into such an industrious national pastime:
next to hockey, watching TV, and making long-distance phone calls, Canadians seem to enjoy nothing more than sitting around and fretting about
who they are. And even more so lately: what with the unsettling prospect
of Quebec separation, the continued depletion of the public sector and the
post-multicultural distrust of nationalism generally, the process of anxious
self-examination has reached a feverish pitch. Indeed, so much of our indigenous cultural activity... seems preoccupied with the question of defining Canada, one wonders if we'd have any indigenous cultural activity
without the question to ask. Imagine it: if Canada were actually defined to
the satisfaction of everyone involved, what would Canadians do for rhetorical amusement? After all, it may only be uncertainty, but it's our uncertainty. The fact is, in the absence of any other unanimously endorsed cultural characteristic, it's all we've got. Without doubt, we're nothing

Assuming that this distinctiveness is worth protecting, and I dare say
most Canadians think it is, how have we done so far? Do we have
cultural industries in Canada that are able to preserve and nurture this
distinctiveness in the face of the United States entertainment juggernaut
spewing American culture across our borders from New York, Nashville,
and Hollywood? The official line from Ottawa is that we have not done
very well. Listen to the litany of grievances coming from the mouths of
Trade Minister Art Eggleton and Canadian Heritage Minister Sheila

' GEOFF PEvERE & GRIEG DYMOND, MoNDo CANucK: A CANADIAN POP CULTURE ODYSSEY, Prentice Hall Canada, 1996.
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Copps. Every time they have had a chance to speak on this subject over
the past year, they recite this mantra:
0 Three-quarters of the television watched every night by Canadians
is of foreign origin, usually American.
0 Four out of every five magazines sold on the newsstands in Canada are foreign magazines, usually American.
0 Ninety-six percent of the screen time at Canadian theatres is taken
up by foreign films, mainly from the United States.
* Seventy percent of the content on Canadian radio stations is nonCanadian, usually from the United States.
This whiney attitude towards the Americans carries over to the national media in Canada. Maclean's, which purports to be Canada's
weekly newsmagazine, and which has prospered thanks to protectionist
tax measures and a huge postal subsidy, is sometimes the worst offender. Instead of celebrating the worldwide success of Canadian author
Michael Ondaatje who wrote The English Patient, Maclean's cover
story, which came out last month at the time of the Academy Awards,
was headlined The Canadian Patient: How Our Book Became Their
Movie.
But does this whining reflect the true situation, or tell the whole
story? I have done a bit of a market reality check and found significant
achievements in the same areas where the Ministers and the media have
pumped out tales of woe:
* Canadian-produced television series are doing better than ever before, both domestically and internationally; consider the recent success
enjoyed by Traders, Due South, This Hour Has 22 Minutes, Newsroom,
Kung Fu: The Legend Continues, The X-Files, and a large number of
animation films produced by Cinar of Montreal and Nelvana of Toronto.
0 Over three-quarters of all magazines read regularly by Canadians
are delivered into their homes through subscriptions and controlled circulation; ninety-four percent of these are Canadian-owned publications.
0 Approximately twenty percent of the films exhibited at Canadian
theatres are now produced by Canadian-owned companies. On a weekby-week basis, approximately thirty percent of the top grossing films in
Canada are now distributed by Canadian-owned distributors. This significant improvement has resulted in part from the designation of Universal
(formerly MCA) by Industry Canada as a Canadian-owned company
following its acquisition by Seagrams, which is controlled by the
Bronfman family of Montreal and New York.
* In worldwide record sales in 1996, Shania Twain sold ten million
copies of The Woman in Me (without even going on tour, except for an
overnight at the White House). Alanis Morissette has sold almost thirty
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million copies of Jagged Little Pill (over two million alone in Canada),
and Celine Dion has sold twenty-one million copies of Falling Into You.
These three Canadian women have dominated prime-time music radio
and television for the past two years in both Canada and the United

States.
o Canada's exports of cultural goods and services now exceed three
billion dollars, an increase of almost 100% since 1990. The United
States represents over eighty percent of this market.
If there is any doubt that Canadian culture is flourishing, look at
what the irreverent cynics, Geoff Pevere and Greig Dymond, have to
say in Mondo Canuck
Certainly, there is more Canadian popular culture than ever, but it's also more
popular than it ever was. Indeed, when one begins to list the names of Canadians
who have made an impact on global entertainment over just the past few years,
the results are nothing short of staggering: Bryan Adams, James Cameron, Jim
Carrey, Doug Coupland, Celine Dion, Atom Egoyan, David Foster, k.d. lang,
Pamela Anderson Lee, Alanis Morissette, Mike Myers, Matthew Perry, Shania
Twain, Steve Williams. And we repeat: that's just the past few years.
Here's our suggestion. What if, for a moment, we were to drop that conventional
Canadian middlebrow disinclination toward popular culture-disinclination which is
still very much alive and well-to suggest that Canada is every bit as distinct in its
approach to schlock as it is to art, and that the former may indeed reveal vastly
more of a national distinction than the latter. That it's possible to see as much of
ourselves (if not more) in Mike Myers as it is in Margaret Atwood. That the
Tragically Hip have as much to tell us (if not more) about the experience of
living in post-Mulroney Canada as Peter Gzowski does. Moreover, what if, contrary to the established Canadian tradition of disowning anyone who dares to seek
and find success elsewhere, we were to expand and ventilate our notion of what's
Canadian to include what Canadians are doing on the global pop-culture stage? If
one agrees first that there is something distinct about the way Canadians view
and engage with the world, then why not allow for the possibility that our semibility is a portable, flexible and resilient one, which influences what Canadians do
no matter where we do it?
If one does begin to think about Canada in terms of the pop culture it produces,
both nationally and internationally, one not only begins to move away from the
us-versus-them national-victimbood model of the past, one in fact starts to see
something so different as to be strikingly so: a "Canada" which is not only sly,
dynamic, intelligent and resourceful, but one that's also a helluva lot more fun
than the old one

Not to put too fine a point on it, but Canadian cultural industries

' PEVERE & DYOMND, supra note 4.
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are thriving. Many of our popular musicians have enjoyed international

success and prosperity. Our television series are winning international
awards and acceptance. Our better authors are awarded major prizes and
receive critical acclaim throughout the English and French-speaking
world. Even our film and television production and distribution companies have grown and prospered. Alliance, Astral, Atlantis, Cinar,
Cineplex Odeon, Coscient, Malofilm, Nelvana, and Paragon are publicly
traded companies with full access to Canadian capital markets for the
purpose of expansion; Norstar and CFP have recently expanded their

capital base through private placements. Canada has an ample supply of
world-class actors, producers, directors, writers, and cameramen. The
value of the Canadian dollar is an attractive incentive to international
productions and union-management relationships are very positive. In
Canada's largest province, Ontario, cultural industries are collectively the
largest employer of individuals, second only to the auto industry.
Strangely, the most upbeat official comment on the development of

Canadian culture comes from Statistics Canada, the government's statistical bureau. Here is the summary from the StatsCan quarterly bulletin
dated Autumn, 1996 on International Trade in the Arts and Culture
Sector.
The songs of Bryan Adams, Celine Dion, the Rankin Family, and k.d. lang; the
novels of Margaret Atwood, Robertson Davies, Anne Hebert, and Antonine
Maillet; the productions of Charles Dutoit, of le Cirque du Soleil, Robert Lepage,
and Carbone 14; the films of Atom Egoyan, and Denys Arcand; and the renowned tenors Berm Heppner, Richard Marigison and Michael Schade, all have
captured the attention of people around the world. And in so doing, they have
helped forge an identifiable image for Canada, a sense of what we stand for, of
what kind of society we are, and of course, the kinds of cultural products weproduce.
Canada's exports of cultural goods and services are growing at unprecedented
rates (increasing almost 83% between 1990 and 1995 to reach just under $3 billion). These export results are not simply due to changes in the value of the
Canadian dollar. Far more important has been the growing international demand
for Canadian cultural goods and services, and acceptance by individual artists and
companies, both large and small, of the challenge of the global marketplace.
Exports of cultural goods (excluding cultural equipment) increased by 125% overall, to reach $1.2 billion in 1995. This rapid growth in our exports is diversified
and is taking place in almost all major cultural export sectors such as publishing,
film and sound recording. International trade data (on commodity exports) indicate
that between 1990 and 1995 exports of books went up by 151% to $246 million;
films by 133% to $65 million; and recordings by 324% to $111 million.
The United States continues to be overwhelmingly our most important export
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market for all cultural fields, accounting for 84% of exports of cultural goods in

1995 (ranging from 75% of our export sales for sound recordings to 99% of our

newspapers and periodicals).6

Given typical Canadian deference to authority, can anyone seriously
quarrel with StatsCan, that irrepressible institutional purveyor of hard
cold facts?
I.

CANADIAN INSTRUMENTS FOR PROTECrING CULTURE

The Canadian approach has always been to attempt to craft its cultural legislation or regulatory action in a manner which is intended to be
consistent with NAFTA and other international trade obligations rather
than to rely on any cultural industries exemption to excuse actions that
are otherwise discriminatory. These measures typically have taken the
form of foreign investment and ownership restrictions, Canadian content
rules, regulatory/licensing conditions, tax incentives, and subsidies. Up
until the successful USTR challenge at the WTO on magazines, this
approach had been successful.
A. Investment Policy
Film industry investment is a good example. Canadian policies established in 1988 prohibit foreign takeovers of Canadian-owned film distribution firms. They allow foreign investors to establish new distribution
firms for proprietary products only. Indirect or direct takeovers of foreign film distribution firms operating in Canada are only allowed if the
investor undertakes to reinvest a portion of its Canadian earnings (usually up to ten percent of gross revenues).
For almost ten years, these policies sustained the status quo, with
the major Hollywood studios established in Canada prior to 1988 (Disney, Paramount, Warner Bros., MCA/Universal, Columbia Tristar,
MGMIUA, and Twentieth Century Fox) being permitted to continue to
build their film and television distribution businesses. In 1996,
MCA/Universal became "Canadian" under the Investment Canada Act
following its acquisition by Seagrams, but it has not changed materially
its film and television production and distribution business which is run
primarily from the United States. If it wanted, Universal could acquire
or establish Canadian cultural businesses free of review by Investment

6 STATISTICS CANADA,

Autumn, 1996.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE ARTS AND CULTURE SECTOR,

Ottawa,
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Canada.
However, Canadian production and distribution firms have taken the
lion's share of new growth in Canada over the last few years. There are
now nine publicly traded Canadian-owned film and television production
and distribution companies, whereas in 1988 there were none.
The restrictive nature of Canadian investment policies recently came
into focus with a high-profile application to Investment Canada filed last
year by Polygram, based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, to
establish a new film distribution firm for non-proprietary products. Polygram argued both privately and publicly that it should be put on the
same level playing field as the grandfathered (pre-1988) Hollywood
studios. As an inducement to the Canadian government to change its
policy, Polygram offered to reinvest a significant portion of its Canadian
earnings in Canadian film production and development.
So far, Polygram has been rebuffed in its very public attempts to
have this application approved. So it must content itself with a much
reduced new distribution firn in Canada distributing only proprietary
films (i.e., films for which Polygram owns the worldwide rights or for
which it contributed more than fifty percent of costs up to the completion of the final negative).
Obviously, the USTR is quite content to let sleeping dogs lie since
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) member companies
(i.e., the Hollywood studios), with their great influence in Washington,
are all essentially grandfathered. However, there is some disquiet among
U.S. interests at the Canadian government's disposition of the Polygram
application since the outcome seems to have validated yet another precedent for discriminatory treatment in investment which could be invoked
by Canada in other cultural sectors possibly against U.S. interests. Also,
this decision represents a dangerous precedent in that it might be inyoked by the Europeans against U.S. interests. From a Canadian perspective, the continued use of investment restrictions raises questions
about the appropriateness of an inward-looking cultural policy. Given the
fact that the Hollywood competition is effectively grandfathered, it is
worth asking whether Canada would have benefitted more from the
increased global opportunities its industry would have received from
Polygram than it does by simply shutting Polygram out of Canada.
One can contrast the government's decision on Polygram with its
decision in 1994 to allow Viacom, Inc. of New York to acquire indirectly all of the Canadian interests of Paramount Communications, Inc.,
also a U.S. company. Included in the Viacom undertakings negotiated in
return for allowing the transaction to proceed in Canada was a commitment to provide international distribution of at least four Canadian fea-
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ture films of suitable commercial quality before the end of 1999.
Foreign investment policy in Canada respecting the publishing of
books is another example of the Canadian approach. In 1985, well before the FTA, the government of Canada established policies prohibiting
non-Canadians from establishing new book publishing businesses or directly acquiring any existing businesses, whether Canadian or foreigncontrolled. Up until 1992, this policy also extended to indirect acquisitions as a result of mergers and acquisitions of parent firms outside
Canada, with divestiture of control to Canadians of the Canadian publishing business required within a period of two years at fair market
price.
These restrictive policies were relaxed somewhat in January, 1992.
First, direct acquisitions are permitted in extraordinary circumstances
where a vendor is in clear financial distress and Canadians are first
given a full and fair opportunity to purchase. Second, if a non-Canadian
publishing business is to be acquired directly or indirectly by other nonCanadians then, instead of divestiture within two years, the foreign
investor is required to negotiate specific commitments related to the
development of Canadian authors, to support the infrastructure of the
book distribution system in Canada (e.g., warehousing and order
fulfillment in Canada, active participation in industry cooperative ordering/distribution/marketing endeavours), accessibility of the purchaser's
Canadian marketing and distribution infrastructure or international network to interested compatible Canadian-controlled publishers on a contractual basis, and to education and research through financial and professional assistance to institutions offering programs in publishing studies.
These relaxed book publishing policies have been applied under the
Investment Canada Act in several high-profile cases. In November,
1992, the Canadian government approved the acquisition of
HarperCollins Canada Limited by News International plc, with the purchaser making significant undertakings of benefit to Canada under each
of the four policy categories of the book publishing guidelines discussed
above.
In 1994, the Canadian government approved the re-acquisition by
Paramount Communications Inc. of a fifty-percent controlling interest in
Ginn Publishing and Maxwell MacMillan Canada both of which had
been the subject of a pre-1992 divestiture to the Canadian Investment
Development Corporation (CIDC). Significant undertakings were given
by Paramount Communications, Inc. and its publishing subsidiary,
Prentice Hall Canada, related to development of Canadian authors, support of infrastructure, permitting accessibility for Canadian-controlled
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publishers, and commitment to education and research. These undertakings, which were a matter of considerable political controversy because
the controlling interest in these Canadian book businesses was passing
from Canadian to foreign hands, were confirmed and adopted in late
1994 as part of the Investment Canada approval of the indirect acquisition of all Canadian cultural industries of Paramount Communications
Inc. by Viacom Inc. of New York. In fact, the term of these undertakings was extended as a result of this subsequent acquisition for a period
up to the end of 1999.
B. Import Policies
Apart from investment policies, Canada has had a number of import
policies applicable to cultural industries. The most notorious, of course,
was recently struck down by the WTO panel on magazines. Tariff Code
9958, in place since 1965, essentially banned foreign split-run periodicals at the border in an effort to preserve Canadian print advertising
dollars for the Canadian magazine industry. The WTO panel found that
this measure was a clear violation of Article XI.1 of GATT 1994 which
is a rule against quantitative import restrictions.
Another more subtle import restriction designed to promote Canadian
magazines related to preferential postal rates. In general terms, there is a
five to ten percent differential in postal rates between those magazines
distributed by mail in Canada and those imported by mail. Moreover,
there are a number of technical discounts available to magazines mailed
domestically not available to those mailed from outside the country. The
WTO panel struck down this differential in postal rates. Significantly,
however, a more substantive measure that Canada has had in place for
many years provides for funded or subsidized postal rates, available only
to Canadian-owned magazines. The WTO panel found that this funded
scheme was an acceptable subsidy under Article mH.8(b) of GAIT 1994
and was, therefore, not inconsistent with Canada's trade obligations. In
practical terms, this means that a Canadian magazine can be mailed in
Canada today for 8.6¢ while a foreign magazine would cost 380 to
mail. This subsidy will continue until at least March 31, 1999.
C. Tax Policies
The most important issue before the WTO panel on magazines involved Canada's attempt to use the Excise Tax Act to achieve a cultural
objective favouring Canadian-owned magazines. To counter the introduction of a split-run edition of Sports Illustrated in 1993, the Canadian
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government subsequently introduced an eighty-percent tax imposed on
the value of advertising contained in all split-run magazines. Since the
tax on its face appeared to be "country neutral," the Canadian government took the position that the tax was in full compliance with
Canada's international trade obligations although clearly it was aimed at
Sports Illustrated Canada and would not apply to Canadian-owned magazines since there were no Canadian split-runs that would be subject to
the tax.
In response to the challenge launched by the United States under the
GATr, Canada's main argument before the WTO panel, as well as the
case under appeal, was that the tax was imposed on advertising services
rather than the magazines themselves as goods. Therefore, it was the
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) that applied, not
GATT 1994 which addresses trade in goods. GATS has no specific
commitments regarding advertising services which is therefore tantamount to an exemption. In its most significant finding, the WTO panel
rejected this approach and found that the spirit of global free trade and
the express wording of various international agreements supported a
more liberal view. Specifically, the panel found that GATT 1994 and
GATS can coexist without either taking priority over the other. Moreover, the panel found that several precedents exist which permit a consideration of trade and services, including advertising services, under
GATT. In its final ruling, the panel found that imported split-run periodicals were subject to an internal tax in excess of that applied to domestic split-run periodicals. While Canada argued that the tax applied only
to the advertising contained as an input to the product, the panel noted
that the tax was indeed applied to the magazine as a "good" since the
tax was calculated on a "per issue" basis and did not apply to advertising services contained in other media, only to periodicals. Accordingly, the panel found that the tax constituted excess taxation applied to
foreign split-run magazines in breach of Canada's commitments under
GATf 1994.
In my view, the eighty-percent tax represented an overextension of
Canadian policy which purported to pursue "national treatment" in principle, but not in practice. The demise of the tax before the WTO should
not have been surprising, given the crisis-driven approach which gave
rise to its creation. The Canadian government was pushed into this
initiative by an overly aggressive Canadian magazine industry whose
representatives actually conceived and drafted the measure, intending to
take direct aim at Sports Illustrated Canada. Remember, this magazine
was legally established, with the approval of Investment Canada in 1990
and Revenue Canada in 1993. Rejecting any compromise based on
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grandfathering, the proponents effectively caused Canada to catapult its
entire panoply of tariff and postal measures respecting magazines onto
the world stage of the WTO, with the prospect of an uncertain legal
result. Indeed, Canada refused to heed serious warnings, within its own
Parliament that the measure was a flawed piece of punitive tax legislation which was not necessary to maintain the government's policy
against split-runs, and which might provoke an unnecessary trade war
with the United States. The Canadian government also elected not to
follow a recommendation of a Task Force created to consider the state
of the Canadian magazine industry. Their recommendation would have
provided limited "grandfathered" status for Sports Illustrated Canada.
The result may be far more damaging to the longstanding protective
legislative and regulatory regime for Canadian magazines and other
cultural industries than would ever have been the case had reason prevailed when the Canadian magazine lobbyists first advocated a draconian
solution without clearly and fairly identifying the problem. In fact, their
solution in search of a problem may have now actually created one.
D. BroadcastingPolicy
It is in the field of broadcasting that Canada is most aggressive in
its protection of Canadian cultural industries-television broadcasting,
cable television, direct-to-home satellite broadcasting, radio, and even
aspects of telecommunications. Through a complex regulatory thicket
which limits foreign ownership, imposes Canadian content quotas, requires domestic distribution commitments, and denies tax deductions for
cost of advertising in foreign broadcast and print media when the advertising is directed primarily at Canadians, Canada has long-standing service barriers which were scarcely impacted by the FTA and NAFTA.
In fact, there are only four cultural areas which are not exempted
from national treatment principles on a prospective basis by the
FTA/NAFTA cultural industries exemption. The first relates to Article
1607(4) of the FTA, which provides that in the event that Canada requires the divestiture of a business in a cultural industry pursuant to its
review of an indirect acquisition by an American, Canada shall offer to
purchase the business enterprise from the American at fair open market
value as determined by an independent, impartial assessment. This is the
provision which caused the Canada Investment Development Corporation
to purchase the controlling fifty-percent interest in Ginn Publishing and
Maxwell MacMillan Canada in the late 1980s from Paramount/PrenticeHall (later re-acquired by Paramount/Viacom in 1994).
The second exception relates to retransmission rights and the agree-
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ment by both the United States and Canada to provide copyright protection to owners of programs broadcast by distant stations and retransmitted by cable companies.7
The third exception relates to the elimination of the requirement that
a magazine or newspaper must be typeset and pinted in Canada in
order for advertisers to be able to deduct their expenses for advertising
space in that magazine!
A fourth exception related to the elimination of tariffs on any inputs
to and products of the cultural industries such as 9musical instruments,
cassettes, film, recording tape, records and cameras.
Other than these cultural areas to which the FTA/NAFTA rules
apply, Canada has not hesitated to develop and expand its broadcasting
policy under The BroadcastingAct which lists among its objectives, "to
safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada." The CRTC has been given a broad regulatory
mandate by Parliament.
One of the CRTC's most significant policies developed under this
mandate concerns a situation where a Canadian television programming
service is licensed in a format competitive with that of a non-Canadian
service authorized for distribution in Canada. In this instance, the CRTC
can drop the non-Canadian service if the new Canadian applicant requests it to do so. This is exactly what occurred in June 1994 when the
CRTC de-listed Country Music Television (CMT) and licensed a competitive new Canadian specialty channel, New Country Network (NCN).
CMT, which has been doing business in Canada for about ten years
prior to being delisted, subsequently filed a section 301 petition with the
USTR seeking relief as well as seeking relief in the Federal Court of
Canada. Eventually, trade action was averted when the new Canadian
licensee reached a commercial resolution with CMT which involved the
new licensee having access to the CMT name, programming and other
licensing benefits in return for having provided CMT with a twentypercent equity interest in the new licensee (the maximum direct foreign
ownership permitted for a Canadian broadcaster).
Although the CMT de-listing is the most high-profile dispute to
arise in recent times under this policy, there is no doubt that the policy
has effectively deterred potential new U.S. entrants from attempting to
directly enter the Canadian broadcasting market. Seeking status as an

FrA, supra note 1, at art. 2006.
8 Id. at art. 2007.

Id. at art. 401.
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eligible satellite service under the sponsorship of a Canadian licensee is
often touted as an easier route to Canada for U.S. television services
given the onerous requirements of the alternative method of market
access, becoming a licensed service by the CRTC. However, the threat
of becoming delisted months or possibly years after establishing a business in Canada as a result of the CRTC's non-competition policy makes
even this method of market entry an uncertain proposition.
In December 1995, the CRTC issued two national direct-to-home
(DTH) satellite TV licenses and simultaneously, a number of DTH payper-view (PPV) licenses. The PPV licenses included two new conditions
clearly aimed at U.S. programming, particularly feature films. First, it
was made a condition of license that non-proprietary feature film rights
must be acquired from Canadian-owned distributors. The effect of this
condition will be to give Canadian film distribution companies significant market advantage if not a monopoly with respect to a majority of
feature films which are increasingly "non-proprietary" in terms of their
financial and corporate structure. A second condition of license was that
revenues earned from the exhibition of all non-Canadian feature films
must be split, on a title-by-title basis, one-third to the DTH service, onethird to the programming undertaking, and one-third to the producer/distributor. This mandatory fee cap further reduces the amount of
revenue that a U.S. feature film producer can receive from exploitation
of the film in Canada, and hence acts as a diminution of its intellectual
property right and a restraint on its competitive position.
The U.S.-based film studios appealed these licensing conditions both
to the Federal Court of Appeal and to the Canadian Federal Cabinet in
1996, but both appeals were unsuccessful. Of particular note is the Federal Court's determination that film distribution is a necessary aspect of
the CRTC's broadcasting mandate appropriately subject to its jurisdiction. In my view, this judicial ruling constitutes a significant expansion
to the CRTC's jurisdiction and will no doubt embolden it in its policymaking role in the future. As a result of these unsuccessful challenges
to the CRTC's actions in the film distribution area, the USTR has indicated that it will continue to closely monitor the effect of these policies
on U.S. interests, including possibly taking appropriate remedies under
either GAIT 1994 (WTO) or NAFrA.
In March 1997, Canadian distribution interests urged the CRTC to
impose similar conditions respecting the licensing of video-on-demand.
The U.S.-based studios opposed this further application of these restrictive conditions. The CRTC decision is expected imminently.
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E. Telecommunications Policy
In the recently concluded WTO negotiations on basic telecommunication services, Canada retained a 46.7% limit on foreign ownership, a
requirement for "Canadian control" of basic telecom facilities, and a
routing restriction to promote the use of Canadian facilities for domestic
traffic. The routing restrictions are with regard to both domestic Canadian and international traffic, but the international traffic restrictions will
be phased out over time. These restrictions have implications for cultural
industries given the likelihood in this age of convergence of the telcos
being permitted to be carriers of entertainment product in competition
with the cable companies.
F. Possible Canadian Complaints Against the United States
Canada has, until very recently, pursued its cultural policies only on
the domestic front, whether through the CRTC, Investment Canada, the
tax system, or the postal system. Unlike the USTR which carefully
documents each year in its National Trade Estimates Canadian barriers
to U.S. cultural industry exports and investment, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFA]T) in its annual
"Register of U.S. Barriers to Trade" published at the beginning of April
each year rarely mentions U.S. measures impacting adversely on the
export of Canadian cultural products. In the April 1, 1997, sixteen-page
DFAIT Report on United States Barriers, there is no mention of cultural
industries other than a cryptic reference to section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1994, and the situation where the USTR initiated a section 301 investigation against Canada based on the petition filed by Country Music
Television (CMT). The DFAIT Report noted that USTR on February 6,
1996 had made a determination that certain Canadian broadcasting practices are discriminatory, but the same report also noted that the companies involved in the CMT dispute had signed an agreement thus ending
the dispute, subject to ongoing U.S. monitoring.
One would have thought that the DFAIT Report might have referenced the unprecedented joint letter dated July 1, 1996 sent to the
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by the
USTR, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Justice,
and the U.S. Department of Commerce. This letter was in the context of
applications filed by two U.S. companies, TelQuest Ventures and Western Tele-Communications Inc., for satellite licenses making use of the
facilities of Telesat Canada. The applications were subsequently denied
by the FCC. The joint letter which opposed the grant of licenses under
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these conditions raised questions of foreign trade, or competition policy
within the jurisdiction of the U.S. executive branch and was based on
the fact that the Government of Canada had not formally authorized
Telesat to launch satellites into the Canadian orbital slots for the purposes described in the applications.
This unprecedented intervention to deny two U.S. cable companies
access to a Canadian satellite facility under a negotiated arrangement
made specific reference to both Canadian content restrictions and Cana-

dian licensing restrictions. Respecting content, the joint letter noted:
Canada discriminates against U.S. and other foreign programmers and service
providers in a number of ways. For example, Canada imposes extensive content
restrictions on television and cable broadcasting including a requirement that the
direct-to-home (DTH) service providers offers a preponderance (a minimum of
50%) of Canadian content. Further, these regulations are subject to unpredictable
change after a nontransparent government review. As one result of this uncertainty, a U.S. DTH pay audio service was twice granted a broadcasting license only
to have it overturned each time to allow consideration of whether more Canadian
content should be required.

On the licensing restrictions in Canada, the joint letter stated:
The Government of Canada also maintains restrictions over the use of non-Canadian satellites for the distribution of telephone and broadcasting services to Canada. The Canadian government would not allow a U.S. satellite to provide DTH
services to Canada-the exact analogy of the TelQuest and WTCI proposals. Even
if the Government of Canada were to allow U.S. satellites to offer DTH service
to Canada, Canada's content restrictions would prohibit a U.S. DTH provider (or
its Canadian affiliate) from offering its DTH service to Canadian customers. The
Government of Canada allows a temporary exception to these licensing restrictions
if there is no available Canadian satellite, but that does not guarantee that the
license will be available or renewable for a specific license term. The Government could revoke the authorization at any time that a Canadian satellite becomes
available.

Thus, we see really for the first time, U.S. administrative and regu-

latory action brought to bear as a form of indirect retaliation for Canadian content and licensing restrictions, as outlined above. Why the DFAIT,
in its April 1, 1997 Report on U.S. Barriers, did not reference this unprecedented joint intervention as a barrier to Canadian export of telecommunication services is a curious oversight, to say the least.
IV. THE CANADIAN VIEW OF THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE

Perhaps surprisingly, Canada has never really feared retaliatory measures of "equivalent commercial effect" under FTA/NAFTA because
Canada, with one exception, has been quite careful in framing its cultur-
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al initiatives that are not inconsistent but for the "cultural industries"
exclusion. This certainly appears to be the case with respect to investment restrictions on film and television distribution and book publishing,
and Canadian content and distribution requirements on television, DTH
pay-per-view, and radio. Only with respect to magazines has Canada
crossed the line. The tariff prohibition and preferential postal rates were
found to violate "national treatment." But these measures were in place
long before FTA or NAFTA. Even the impugned eighty percent excise
tax imposed on advertising in split-run magazines was purported to be
country-neutral and, therefore, not inconsistent with Canada's international trade obligations, although, as the WTO panel concluded, this was
more in theory than in practical application.
The Canadian view of the U.S. perspective on respecting culture
comes down to a simple explanation. "Cultural industries" is not a term
that the United States understands or appreciates on a philosophical
level, notwithstanding its precise definition in both the RCA and
NAFTA. If there has to be a term, the Americans prefer "entertainment
business."
The best explanation I have heard of the American psyche comes
from U.S. academic George Quester writing on the International Politics
of Television in 1990:
Many Americans are relatively unaware of the extent of the success of their entertainment business in selling television programs abroad. Why do Americans pay
so little attention to the outside world? Because all the world is fascinated by the
Manhattan skyline and San Francisco Bay, by blue jeans and screen entertainment. When all roads led to Rome, the Romans were less worldly than worlddominant. When Britannia ruled the waves, the British did not study the world as
much as sail around it.

Particularly when it comes to pop culture, Americans believe the
Canadian stuff is the same as the American, maybe slightly warmed
over. Canadians believe otherwise. As Pevere and Dymond observed in
Mondo Canuck
Canadian was distinct. Indeed, because the country was otherwise largely dominated by various forms of American media, the contrast was all the more stark: in
the noisy din of U.S. network programming, the Canadian stuff stuck out like a
stunned moose in the middle of the Trans-Canada Highway.'0

Americans believe entertainment is a business just like any other
business -- subject to the rules of free trade and the application of na-
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tional treatment by all parties to the FTA/NAFA. And, until recently,
the United States believed there was only one way to deal with discriminatory trade practices in the entertainment business, and that is through
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
I am sure my fellow panelist, John Ragosta, will have a detailed and
sophisticated analysis of this measure which is much talked about and
feared in the international trade community. So I am not going to be so
bold as to go too far along this road. However, I do want to give a
Canadian impression.
Generally, Canadians regard Section 301 as unilateral and coercive.
In Canada we have tried to learn and understand the distinctions between a "Super 301," a "Special 301," and a "Regular 301". A Super
301 tends to be more like a shot gun aimed at countries cited by the
U.S. government as engaging in "broad and consistent patterns of unfair
trade practices" and mandating unilateral retaliation following consultations within strict time limits. A Special 301 is more like a big stick
backed up by a high-powered rifle, with which the USTR is directed to
identify countries which deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. Canada felt the threat of this U.S. big stick in
1994 for the first time in relation to its current and proposed policies
related to magazine publishing. ,
A Special 301 is distinguished from a Regular 301 in that its investigations must be concluded in final determinations rendered within six
months of initiation, subject to a three-month extension where complex
issues are involved or where there is progress in bilateral negotiations
for a settlement or where the target country is taking action to remedy
the source of U.S. concern. Compare this six-to-nine-month timeframe to
the standard twelve-to-eighteen-month timeframe for Regular 301 proceedings which we call the little stick, backed up by a low-powered
rifle. In cases where the USTR determines that action is warranted under
a Special 301, retaliation normally is triggered within thirty days following conclusion of the investigation, and the USTR retains broad
discretion to trigger a wide variety of retaliatory measures.
A Regular 301 or a little stick was what then USTR Mickey Kantor
used in invoking the first formal challenge to discriminatory Canadian
magazine practices on March 11, 1996. He appears to have used this
simply to provide some kind of time discipline to his invocation of
dispute settlement procedures of the WTO. In fact, the Regular 301 stick
dovetailed nicely with WTO procedures in that it simply allows the
USTR to make a determination as to whether the Canadian practices are
actionable under Section 301 "by no later than 30 days after the conclusion of the WTO settlement proceedings or 18 months after the initia-
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tion of the Section 301 investigation, whichever is earlier." It looks like
the time discipline of this little stick may have had some effect since
the WTO is likely to complete its hearing of the Canadian appeal by
July or August this year, whereas the eighteen-month period following
the initiation of the Regular 301 little-stick investigation does not come
until September 11, 1997.
In this sense, the Regular 301 authority is not as unilateral or coercive as the Special or Super 301 authority since it appears to accommodate the WTO dispute settlement process including the WTO obligations
or rules established under GATT 1994. It remains to be seen whether
Canada complies with the WTO ruling once appeal rights and compliance periods are exhausted, or whether the United States must resort to
triggering retaliatory measures.
Canada appears to be capable and willing to accommodate the Regular 301 proceedings, whether initiated by the USTR or on petition of
aggrieved private U.S. parties. Not only does the Regular 301 proceed
on a more reasonable timeframe, but it implicitly acknowledges the
rules-based multinational approach inherent in the WTO process which
on a reciprocal basis can be of immense benefit to Canada and other
WTO members who have significant trading relations with the United
States.
This is a trend is in the right direction, in my view. In his March
11, 1996 announcement, USTR Mickey Kantor indicated that the magazine dispute with Canada is the third such matter that the Clinton administration had taken to the WTO since the establishment of the USTR
Enforcement Unit in January, 1996. On the Canadian side, there have
been five GAIT panels established at Canada's request since 1989 to
rule on U.S. trade practices, dealing with fresh, chilled, and frozen pork;
alcoholic and malt beverages; softwood lumber, magnesium; and limits
on the use of foreign tobacco. The Helms-Burton legislation related to
Cuba is another U.S. measure which, until late March, 1997, appeared
headed for the WTO at the behest of the Europeans, but with strong
support from Canada. The deal worked out between the E.U. and the
United States last week included U.S. commitments to amend or suspend parts of Helms-Burton in return for E.U. commitments to develop
rules covering dealing with expropriated property within the framework
of the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).
Whether you want to call it "cultural industries" or the "entertainment business," serious trade disputes between Canada and the United
States which are incapable of resolution through bilateral consultations
are more likely to be resolved in Geneva or Paris than in Washington or
Ottawa. For Canada, this is not a bad result in the bigger scheme of
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things.
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article, I noted that a more appropriate title for
this discussion might have been "Canada-U.S. Cultural Industries Disputes Outside of NAFTA." In making this observation, I did not mean
to suggest that the cultural industries exemption in the context of the
FTA/NAFTA is not a significant development in Canada-U.S. trade
relations simply because it has never been, and may never be, invoked.
Quite to the contrary, the very existence of the cultural industries exemption, irrespective of its lack of use, is hugely significant in terms of
what it does not accomplish. The fact that neither the United States or
Canada has ever sought formal recourse to the provision-either to justify
a discriminatory action or to explain a retaliatory measure-suggests to
many that this "tit-for-tat" approach to conflict resolution has only frozen the parties in their respective ideological spheres, each side feeling
that it gained the upper hand in the trade negotiation if only on paper.
But one wonders how long such posturing can continue.
As the examples of potential cultural trade disputes continue to
mount, the strategy of avoidance is increasingly giving way to renewed
consideration of how best to achieve cultural goals while keeping markets open. Ultimately, the disquieting experience with the enigmatic
cultural industries exemption may be an incentive to create realistic and
workable trade rules, as opposed to trade exemptions, that go much
further in striking this balance.
The WTO panel decision on magazines may represent somewhat of
a watershed for the cultural industries exemption in Canada. By resorting to excessive measures in the form of the eighty-percent tax on advertising in split-run magazines, the Canadian government effectively
exposed its cultural industries to the national treatment requirements of
GAT 1994 by precipitating the successful U.S. challenge at the WTO.
Barring an unexpected turn about at the WTO appellate body, Canada
will have to bring its laws into conformity with GATT 1994 as defined
by the WTO panel, revoke the prohibitive tariff and preferential postal
rates, and repeal the eighty-percent excise tax. This will lead to domestic pressure to come up with other measures or subsidies to satisfy the
political demand for uniquely Canadian magazines.
As a result, the ground has shifted away from the rather crude "titfor-tat" mechanism established by FTA/NAFTA based on an "exemption-retaliation for inconsistency" and moved over to the rules-based
approach of the WTO in interpreting GAT 1994, the GATS, and the
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MA. Granted, both the GATS and MAI have a cultural industries carve
out of a sort. But, significantly, the WTO panel on magazines found
that GATT 1994 and GATS can coexist without either taking priority
over the other, and that there are several precedents which permit a
consideration of trade and services, including advertising services, under
GATT 1994.
The practical short-run effect for Canada after eighteen months will
be that there will be fewer protections for its magazine industry than it
had before it introduced the eighty-percent excise tax. For the United
States, the retaliation was far more effective under the WTO since there
was no "equivalent commercial effect" limitation. Moreover, the WTO
panel decision will have far more authoritative impact in Europe and
Asia, where U.S. entertainment interests are regularly subject to local
discriminatory practices than would a NAFTA panel decision upholding
U.S. retaliatory measures against Canada "of equivalent commercial
effect."
In Canada, the setback on magazines has a bright side to it. A public policy debate has been precipitated on how best to support and develop Canadian culture. Shortly after news of the WTO panel was released in January, International Trade Minister Art Eggleton delivered a
milestone speech at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University entitled "Can Canada Maintain its Cultural Identity in the Face of Globalization?" He questioned whether Canada's cultural protections which
limit foreign investment in cultural industries and Canadian content rules
are actually hindering Canada's exports of cultural goods and services.
The Trade Minister indicated that he thinks the current method of dealing with culture in international trade agreements through exemptions (as
was done in the NAFTA) is no real protection at all for Canada's cultural interests. A better approach, according to Mr. Eggleton, might be
to formulate concrete rules for trade in cultural products.
Just two weeks later, Canadian Heritage Minister Sheila Copps countered with some musings of her own, suggesting that the CRTC impose
an "expenditure cap" on the purchase of non-Canadian television programming to leave more money free for Canadian programming, or
revisions to Canadian content rules by excluding sports and news, or
requiring radio broadcasters to cluster their Canadian content in prime
time.
These public musings of Ministers have precipitated further policy
discussion as to Canada's approach to culture which, in my view, is a
healthy sign that Canada is recognizing global changes and the need for
adjustment to a rules-based international environment where culture is
enhanced based on its on intrinsic merit without resorting to trade dis-
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torting measures. A rules-based approach without reference to economic
power should benefit a medium-sized market economy such as Canada's.
One policy idea that has been advanced in a paper prepared by Daniel
Schwanen of the C.D. Howe Institute and released on April 22nd is the
de-linking of foreign-ownership from the delivery of Canadian cultural
products, suggesting that there is no automatic connection between the
cultural content embodied in the product and the ownership of the enterprise delivering or marketing the product. The truth in this premise is
demonstrated by Seagram's acquisition of control of Universal studios in
which case Canadian ownership has had no apparent impact on the output of Canadian culture by that studio. While the relaxation of foreign
investment restrictions is heresy to some in Ottawa, it does offer an
interesting solution to the Canadian conundrum. Mr. Schwanen notes
that the policy implications of this approach for foreign investment are
fairly clear.
Subsidies towards products aimed at a Canadian audience and the awarding of
"shelf space" for such products should be open to foreign owners who can make
an original contribution to the Canadian market... [and] in the vast majority of
cases this will involve making use of Canadian talent and carrying Canadian
perspectives.

The WTO magazine decision has clearly precipitated this debate.
The events of the next twelve to eighteen months following the election
should result in a more modem and global approach towards developing
Canadian culture than has prevailed over the past twenty years with its
more protectionist approach. Significantly, I believe that it will be Canadian artists seeking to access international markets and distribution,
bolstered by political support from Canadian owners of cultural enterprises pursuing their own self interest, who will eventually carry the day
in this debate in Canada. The regime that will result, while not totally
to the liking of the U.S. entertainment establishment, will have a clear
and more fairly balanced set of rules that allow for foreign participation
on a level Canadian playing field.
And let us not forget that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander. Just as the USTR found it effective and convenient to take
Canada to the WTO on magazines, so can Canada and the Europeans
take the United States to the WTO on matters such as Helms-Burton or
licensing and foreign ownership of telecommunications services.
In summary, the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States respecting cultural industries and the entertainment business is
tending to be subsumed over time by the multilateral framework provided by the WTO or the OECD for both negotiations and dispute settle-
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ment. And in a global economy, is this not in everyone's interest?

